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Abstract 
 
We examined how general intelligence, personality, and emotional intelligence—measured as 
an ability using the MSCEIT—predicted performance on a selective-attention task requiring 
participants to ignore distracting emotion information. We used a visual prime in which 
participants saw a pair of faces depicting emotions; their task was to focus on one of the faces 
(the target) while ignoring the other (the distractor). Next, participants categorized a string of 
letters (word or nonword), which was either congruent to the target or the distractor. The speed 
of response to categorizing the string was recorded. Given the emotional nature of the stimuli 
and the emotional information processing involved in the task, we were surprised to see that 
none of the MSCEIT branches predicted performance. However, general intelligence and 
openness to experience reduced response time.  
 
 
Keywords: selective attention, emotional intelligence, intelligence, personality, MSCEIT, 
emotion processes, lexical decision task, inhibition.
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Research Highlights 
• We modeled emotional intelligence, personality, and general intelligence as predictors 
of performance in an emotional task requiring selective attention  
• We used an errors-in-variables specification to correct for measurement error in the 
predictors 
• Scores on the ability EI test (MSCEIT) did not show any association with performance 
in the selective attention task, casting doubt on the construct validity of the MSCEIT 
• General intelligence and Openness to Experience speeded up correct answers.  
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1. Introduction 
In light of recent findings demonstrating the important role emotions play in decision-
making and behavior, the ability to manage emotions has emerged as a fundamental quality for 
everyday functioning (cf. Bechara & Damasio, 2005). Emotions have adaptive functions; thus, 
accurately interpreting emotional signals may provide substantial evolutionary advantages 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).  
Gardner (1983) first suggested that the ability to handle emotions is an important 
foundation of adaptive behavior. In his theorization of the “multiple intelligences,” Gardner 
introduced the notion that interpreting and understanding emotions in oneself and others may 
be considered two distinct types of intelligence: Intrapersonal and interpersonal intelligence. 
The basic idea that adaptive functioning cannot simply be captured by standard intelligence 
tests—and that paying attention to emotions and acting on them being an equally important 
facet of intelligent functioning—was again put forward some years later by Salovey and Mayer 
(1990); they coined the term “Emotional Intelligence” (EI) to suggest that emotion and 
intelligence were not adversaries but complementary. Some have suggested, though, that 
emotions may interfere with thought (Steel, 1997); however, emotions may also support 
thinking processes, for example by directing attention and emotional resources towards more 
advantageous solutions (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).  
Whether alternative conceptions of intelligence beyond general intelligence (i.e., “g”) 
are viable is still a hotly debated area (e.g., Antonakis, Ashkanasy, & Dasborough, 2009; 
Gottfredson, 2003; Locke, 2005; Sternberg, 1985) as is the issue of how to conceptualize and 
measure EI (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000; Zeidner, Matthew, & Roberts, 2001). Among 
the questions that remain unanswered is whether: (a) EI, as currently measured, is distinct from 
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general intelligence and personality, (b) can predict incremental variance in outcomes beyond 
personality and intelligence, and (c) involves emotion information processing. 
Our purpose was to contribute to these issues by investigating if EI, measured using a 
performance-based (i.e., ability) test, could predict performance on a selective-attention task 
that required participants to ignore distracting emotion information, and this beyond the effects 
of personality and general intelligence. Evidence that a EI measure can predict such a task 
would provide some support for the theory and its operationalization.  
We first discuss how EI might be situated in the nomological space of intelligence and 
personality and then present the design of our study. 
1.2 Is EI an intelligence? 
Theorists of EI suggest that EI is a higher-order factor comprised of four subabilities 
moderately correlated with general intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). However, these 
theorists have not specifically tackled how the subabilities constituting EI should be related to 
each other and to different components of intelligence, such as fluid (Gf) and crystallized 
intelligence (Gc).   
Cattell (1963) introduced the notion of Gf and Gc to distinguish two correlated 
components of g. The first is defined as the ability to perceive relationships among objects and 
to solve novel problems without relying on previous specific practice or instruction; Gf is 
generally measured with tests that have little cultural and scholastic content, such as those 
including abstract figures and perceptual tasks. Gc refers to the  knowledge gained through 
learning and experience and it is measured with tests based on verbal skills and acquired 
knowledge. These two components tend to correlate strongly with each other (Cattell, 1963), 
thus providing evidence for an overall g factor. Importantly, there is substantial evidence to 
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suggest that overall g predicts important criteria across a variety of domains (Gottfredson & 
Deary 2004; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; 2004) and that specific brain regions correlate with 
variability in g measures (Colom, Jung, & Haier, 2006; Frangou, Chitins, &Williams, 2004; 
Jung & Haier, 2007; Narr, Woods, Thompson, Szeszko, Robinson, Dimtcheva, et al., 2007). 
The very general nature of g, and the fact that it predicts such a general class of outcomes 
suggests that it should predict performance on task requiring pattern identification in novel 
stimuli, whether on emotional or non-emotional ones.  
To what extent is EI different from general intelligence? Being conceptualized as a 
form of intelligence, EI might be related to both Gf and Gc. In fact, it is conceivable that high 
EI individuals would have wider emotion knowledge, but also stronger problem-solving 
abilities in dealing with emotionally charged situations; this latter aspect would not depend 
exclusively on the amount of emotion knowledge possessed, but also on emotion-processing 
resources available. The relationship of EI with Gf and Gc has not been systematically 
addressed by theorists of EI, however. Positive correlations between the Mayer, Salovey and 
Caruso’s MSCEIT and Gc have been reported (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008), suggesting 
that the ability test partly captures knowledge (i.e., emotional knowledge); yet, Mayer and 
Salovey’s definition of EI includes aspect that refer also to Gf, such reasoning about emotions 
and solving problems related to emotions. Understanding to what extent current measures of EI 
as an ability tap into one or the other aspect of intelligence, or both, would help better 
understand the construct and refine current tests. 
In the framework of Carroll’s three stratum model of mental abilities (Carroll, 1993), EI 
might be conceived as a narrower ability subsumed under stratum 2 broad abilities; 
alternatively it might also be considered as a higher order ability on the same level of Gc and 
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Gf (Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2002). Locating EI at the level of either stratum 1 or 2 
would imply that how individuals manage emotions ultimately depends on their level of 
intelligence. Another possibility is to conceive EI as related to, but also distinct, from general 
intelligence and located on Carroll’s stratum 3. Although this possibility has not been overtly 
discussed in the literature of EI, it has been looked at in the cognition and emotion literature, in 
particular regarding the debate on the independence of emotion from cognition (see Eder, 
Hommel, & De Houwer, 2007).  Relying on experimental (e.g., Murphy & Zajonc, 1993) as 
well as neuroanatomical evidence (e.g., Bish, Luu, & Posner 2000) certain scholars have 
suggested that emotion and cognition are “separate but interacting mental functions mediated 
by separate but interacting brain systems” (LeDoux, 1998, p. 69).  
1.3 Is EI personality? 
How to conceive EI with respect to personality is another open question. The domain of 
research on EI is basically split in two between those who consider EI as an ability measured 
with performance tests (Salovey & Mayer, 1990) and those who subsume EI as a broad 
personality dimension assessed through self-report questionnaires (e.g., Petrides & Furnham, 
2001).  From a theoretical point of view only the latter approach endorses correlations between 
EI and personality traits. Nevertheless, more recent research (which has accounted for 
measurement error in the variables) has shown that EI as measured by an EI ability test (i.e., 
the MSCEIT) significantly overlaps not only with IQ, but also with personality (Fiori & 
Antonakis, 2011; Schulte, Ree, & Carretta, 2004). In principle, there is no drawback in finding 
correlations between ability measures and personality. What poses concerns is when the 
construct measured, either EI as an ability or as a broad personality trait, overlaps so much 
with existing personality traits to the extent of becoming redundant. 
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To date, the investigation of the relationships among EI, general intelligence, and 
personality have been approached almost exclusively with a psychometric approach in which 
EI tests’ scores were correlated with personality and intelligence measures. This approach has 
been helpful to evaluate the viability of EI measures, especially their discriminant and 
incremental validity. Yet, the psychometric approach has not addressed which mental 
processes should be associated to emotionally intelligent functioning. In the current study we 
compared the contribution of general intelligence, personality, and EI in predicting 
performance on a selective attention task that required being able to avoid distracting emotion 
information in order to succeed in the task. 
1.4 EI, emotion information processing, and selective attention  
In the current study, we will focus on EI as an ability because this approach is more 
theoretically sound and uses performance-based tests (Daus & Ashkanasy, 2003; Matthews et 
al., 2002). The flagship EI ability test is the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence test 
(MSCEIT, Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). This test, and particularly its precursor the MEIS 
(Mayer, Salovey  & Caruso, 1997), was the first attempt to measure EI according to an 
objective performance assessment rather than relying on self-report measures. The issue of 
scoring the correct answer of items involving emotions was tackled by using what has been 
termed a “general consensus method,” that is, by scoring as correct the answer provided by the 
majority of people. In addition, the test offered also the possibility to score the test according to 
an “expert consensus,” in which the correct answer was the one chosen as correct by a pool of 
experts in emotions.  
The MEIS included 402 items and was developed mainly to test the model of EI as 
composed of 4 sub-abilities or branches: Perceiving emotions, using emotions to facilitate 
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thought, understanding emotions, and managing emotions. The factorial structure of the MEIS 
did not provide strong evidence of the second branch “Facilitating Thought.” With the purpose 
of making the test easier to administer and improve some of its facets, the authors modified 
some features of the MEIS into a newer version that was called Mayer Salovey Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, User’s Manual, Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), 
which has now gone through two revisions.  
The psychometric properties of the latest version have been reported to be satisfactory 
according to the User’s Manual; in particularly, the test appears to be consistent with split-half 
reliabilities of .91 for Perceiving Emotions, .79 for Facilitating Emotion, .80 for Understanding 
Emotions, and .83 for Regulating Emotions (MSCEIT, User’s Manual, Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2002). Also, in this version of the test the correlation of the two scoring systems, 
general and expert consensus, is higher than the previous versions with correlations ranging 
from .93 to .99; this high correlation, between the general and expert consensus, is not 
necessarily a strong point because having lay individuals correlate highly with experts suggests 
that the test may be tapping common knowledge and not expert performance (Fiori & 
Antonakis, 2011). Nonetheless, this ability EI test is reported to be incrementally valid given 
that it is apparently orthogonal to neuroticism, extraversion, and conscientiousness, and 
modestly correlated with agreeableness and openness (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008) as 
well as with general intelligence (IQ) (Brackett & Mayer, 2003).  
In the history of the study of intelligence, the integration of the traditional psychometric 
approach with the analysis of the cognitive processes underlying performance proved to be 
fruitful for understanding the concept of intelligence (Pellegrino & Glaser, 1979). Surprisingly, 
little has been done to employ the same approach for understanding EI. Pioneering work was 
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conducted by Austin (2004, 2005), who compared inspection time (IT) performance of 
emotional and non-emotional tasks with self-report measures of EI and intelligence tests. 
Results using structural equation modeling showed two correlated factors: One including 
performance on the non-emotional IT task and the Raven matrices, and the another regarding 
performance in the emotion task. Overall, speed of processing and emotional performance 
emerged as two related but distinct dimensions. Results also showed a significant correlation (r 
= .21) between the interpersonal scale of the Schutte EI test (Schutte et al., 1998) and 
performance in a task of facial emotion recognition (Austin, 2005), suggesting that 
performance in emotional task was associated to scores of the EI test. 
Whereas results regarding self-report EI measures—such as the Schutte EI test—
confirm some associations with emotion processing, results regarding ability measure of EI are 
rather contrasting. In particular, Roberts and colleagues (2006) found that emotion measures, 
such as recognition of emotions in voice and in pictures, and the Mayer Salovey Caruso 
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT, 2002) failed to load on the same underlying factor. 
Interestingly, the aforementioned emotion measures, but not the MSCEIT factors, loaded on 
general intelligence. The authors concluded:  “we can not suggest that the MSCEIT has stood a 
test of an important aspect of the validation process” (p. 668). 
Farrelly and Austin (2007) analyzed the association between MSCEIT scores, social 
perception ability, general intelligence, and performance on inspection time (IT) task. Results 
of Study 1 showed an association between social perception and the MSCEIT, but not between 
MSCEIT and inspection time of emotional stimuli. In Study 2, inspection time of sad faces 
predicted scores on all MSCEIT branches except Emotion Regulation. However, the MSCEIT 
scores appeared unrelated to inspection time of non-emotional stimuli and to Gf. Furthermore, 
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in contrast to Study 1, social perception ability as measured by the Interpersonal Perception 
Task (IPT, Costanzo & Archer, 1993)—a test that analyzes the ability to interpret spontaneous 
social situations in short conversations—did not predict MSCEIT scores.  
These inconsistent results regarding the relationship between the MSCEIT and emotion 
processing call for further investigation. Theorists of emotional intelligence claim that EI 
concerns the capacity “to carry out sophisticated information processing about emotions and 
emotion-relevant stimuli and to use this information as a guide to thinking and behavior” 
(Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008, p. 503); this suggestion is what provided the impetus for our 
study because how EI is related to emotion processing is still unclear. Furthermore, most 
studies either do not include important related constructs (e.g., personality and intelligence) or 
ignore the effects of measurement error, which can engender misleading results (Fiori & 
Antonakis, 2011).  
Thus, we designed an experiment using robust modeling procedures to examine what 
predicts performance on a selective attention task requiring participants to ignore distracting 
emotion information. Individuals are often required to manage distracting emotion information 
when optimizing decision making, which makes the task ecologically valid. We chose an 
attentional task in light of its relevance to measure aspects of intelligence (Schweizer, 
Moosbrugger, & Goldhammer, 2005). Attentional control has been found to be related to 
working memory capacity (WMC) and fluid intelligence; also, attentional control accounted 
for additional variance, together with secondary memory, in Gf beyond WMC (Unsworth, 
Spillers, & Brewer, 2010). In addition, the neuroscience literature has examined individual 
differences concerning the neural underpinnings of self-oriented and other-oriented empathy—
a construct that shares similarities to EI— and has demonstrated that activation of the Anterior 
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Cingulate Cortex (ACC) is associated to both emotional self-awareness and focused and 
narrow attention (Decety & Batson, 2007; Decety & Michalska, 2010); this finding suggests 
that the kind of attentional mechanisms investigated in the current study, which refer in 
particular to the selection of appropriate responses and the inhibition of inappropriate ones, 
may be involved in the experience of feelings for oneself and for others. 
In the current study, we used a measure of fluid intelligence—Cattell’s Culture Faire—
because we were particularly interested to analyze: (a) If the MSCEIT correlates with this 
aspect of g and (b) whether fluid intelligence predicts performance in an attentional task that 
involves emotional, rather than nonemotional, stimuli. The extent to which EI predicts 
performance on the task beyond the effects of personality and intelligence will provide some 
support for the EI ability measure. Furthermore, it will be theoretically interesting to see 
whether performance in a task requiring emotion information processing is predicted by 
general intelligence and personality. Our study thus sheds unique light on the EI construct; it 
also provides a contribution to the broader literature of individual differences in that not much 
research has examined the concurrent effect of IQ and personality in tasks involving selective 
attention to emotional stimuli.   
1.2 Overview of the study 
Most decision activities require one to allocate resources to informational stimuli. Two 
fundamental processes undergird this routine: Activation and inhibition (Posner & Snyder, 
1975). Activation ensures consideration of goal-relevant information, whereas inhibition 
prevents goal-irrelevant information from interfering with task execution. Inhibition has been 
defined as “the stopping or overriding of a mental process, in whole or in part, with or without 
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intention,” which may influence attention or memory among other processes (MacLeod, 2007, 
p. 5).  
Our experimental task is similar to those used in the emotion and cognitive literatures, in 
particular the affective negative priming (e.g., Joorman & Gotlieb, 2010) and semantic priming 
from attended and unattended parafoveal words (e.g., Ortells et al. 2001). The task, which is 
supposed to involve processes associated to selective attention, is illustrated in Figure 1 and 
consisted of two consecutive trials: In the prime trial two diagrams representing human faces 
with different emotions are introduced. Participants are instructed to attend to one of the faces 
(the target) while ignoring the other (the distractor). In the test trial, a letter string appears and 
participants’ have to indicate whether the letter string is a word, as in a typical lexical decision 
task (LDT). We operationalized performance on this task in terms of how quickly participants 
indicated whether the string was a letter or not.  
Performance in the LDT involving the judgment of a word related to the target was 
expected to facilitate both speed of processing and correct answers. According to the 
associative network model (Bower, 1981), information is stored in nodes that are related by 
semantic and affective meaning. When a node is activated, it also activates other connected 
nodes. In the case of the present task, the prime should activate a network of similar valence 
information that would increase accessibility of related nodes and, as a consequence, reduce 
response time. Instead of being facilitated, performance involving the judgment of a word 
related to the distractor should be impaired.  Paying attention to a stimulus that was previously 
dismissed from attention should interfere with task execution, making information processing 
slower and performance more challenging. Explanations of inhibition effects include impaired 
retrieval in processing information previously categorized as distractors (Houghton & Tipper, 
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1994; Neill, 1977; Tipper, 1985, 2001; Yee, 1991) and conflict between two possible 
responses: “select it” because it is the current object of evaluation, or “ignore it” because it was 
first introduced as a distractor (Neill & Valdes, 1992). Both explanations support the presence 
of inhibitory mechanisms that suppress response—either memory retrieval or attentional 
focus—suggesting that inhibitory processes play a role in response time.   
2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
 We recruited 91 participants from the University of Illinois at Chicago subject pool. We 
obtained useable data on 85 participants (55% females); their mean age was 19.03 years (SD = 
1.62) and the composition of the sample was quite diverse: 37.6% Asian, 16.5% Hispanic, 
29.4% White, and African-American 16.5 %.  
2.2 Measures 
2.2.1. Selective attention task 
The task procedure was drawn from Moon and Lord (2004) and included a series of 
two consecutive trials: A prime trial (3 conditions) crossed with a test trial (3 conditions), the 
latter being the LDT; along with these nine conditions we also included two control conditions 
(for a total of 11 conditions). The prime trial alternated two faces, each one expressing one of 
three different emotions: Anger, sadness, and happiness. In each trial two face diagrams, 
measuring 2 X 2 inches each, were displayed next to each other. The target face was always 
designated as green. The emotions depicted on the target and the distractor were 
counterbalanced across trials and their position changed randomly across trials; thus, 
participants had to search for the target at every trial. In the test trial, adjectives and nouns 
synonymous with happy, angry, and sad were presented, which could be congruent with the 
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target, the distractor, or not related to either of them (control condition); we also included 
surprise words of the same length as additional control conditions as well as nonwords. They 
were formed by changing the first character of 24 meaningful words used as test trials. We 
randomized the combination target-distractor and word-nonword within each set. We measured 
reaction time as the time elapsing between presentation of the word/nonword and the “yes” or 
“no” choice made by the participant.  
 To ensure participants attended to the prime, we gave them a categorization task right 
after the test trial: A list of 4 words indicating different emotions was displayed and 
participants had to indicate which emotion was conveyed by the target face they attended to by 
pressing the key 1, 2, 3 or 4 corresponding to the listed emotion. The categorization task did 
not have any maximum response time and was introduced uniquely to “force” participants to 
attend to instructions.  
 Assessment of correct answers and RT was made via computer using Dell Dimension 
L933r and Dimension 2400 computers and the software program E-Prime, Version 1.2 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002), which is accurate to the millisecond. 
 2.2.2. Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT)  
 The Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) is a 
performance-based measure of EI (Mayer et al., 2002). This on-line 141 item test is scored by 
the publishers and assesses four EI factors or “branches” (each measured using two subscales): 
(a) Perceiving Emotions, (b) Facilitating Thought, (c) Understanding Emotions and (d) 
Managing Emotions. Correct answers were scored according to agreement with expert opinion. 
The test internal consistency reliability (split-half) is r = .93 (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 2004).  
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 2.2.3. Personality Questionnaire 
 The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & Srivastava, 1999) measures five self-rated 
personality dimensions: Extraversion, neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
openness to experience. We used the short version (BFI-44, Benet-Martinez & John, 1998), 
which includes 44 items. Benet-Martinez and John (1998) reported alpha coefficients of .88, 
.84, .79, .82, and .81, respectively, for the dimensions listed above in a sample of 711 English-
speaking participants. 
 2.2.4. General Intelligence Test 
 We used Cattell’s “Culture Fair” test, Scale 3 Form B (Cattell, Krug, & Burton, 1973). 
The scale includes four subtests involving different tasks: Completing series, classifying, 
solving matrices, and evaluating conditions. This scale’s reliability is .85. 
3. Results 
We analyzed data at the individual level and used MPlus’s maximum likelihood 
cluster-robust (sandwich) MLR estimator to correct standard errors for nonindependence 
(Muthén & Muthén, 2010) at the individual level. Hence, we maintained a large number of 
observations (6449 trials for 85 subjects), while considering variability at the participant level, 
where individual trials depended on different manipulations. We analyzed speed of response 
for correct answers (i.e., 82.47% of total trials; excluding responses, n = 32 trials, that were 
faster than 2SD from mean response time did not change results). In addition, we used an 
errors-in-variables specification to correct for measurement error in the predictors (i.e., EI, 
intelligence, and personality); we modeled latent variables by constraining the residual 
variance of its observed variable x to (1- reliabilityx)*Variancex (Bollen, 1989) using the 
population reliabilities.  
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Refer to Table 1 for descriptive statistics. The means and standard deviations we report 
for the MSCEIT are very similar to those reported by Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios 
(2003) in a very large scale study (n = 2,112); they reported the following means (and SDs): 
Branch 1: .54 (.13); Branch 2: .45 (.08); Branch 3: .60 (.13); Branch 4: .42 (.09). Thus, there 
does not seem to be any range restriction in our MSCEIT data. Of note is that three out of four 
branches of the MSCEIT showed a moderate correlation with the Cattell’s Culture Fair, 
demonstrating that the MSCEIT is associated to fluid intelligence. The only branch that was 
not correlated with fluid intelligence was Branch 4 (Managing emotions), suggesting that this 
section of the MSCEIT may measure more crystallized aspect of intelligence (or indeed 
something else).  The average bivariate latent correlation of the MSCEIT factors with response 
time is very low (i.e., -.02). Also, the average latent correlation of the branches with each other 
is only .39; we also found some very strong correlations of EI with personality (e.g., 
agreeableness and Branch 2 correlating .52; openness and Branch 4 correlating .46) and 
intelligence (e.g., with correlations up to .39) and some very low correlations within the 
branches (e.g., Branch 4 correlated -.02 and .12 with Branches 1 and 2 respectively). These low 
interfactor MSCEIT correlations suggest that a general higher-order EI factor does not drive 
the variance in the first-order branches. Estimating a structural model with all the predictors 
and a using higher order EI factor failed to fit the data, χ2(71) = 140.71, p < .001, CFI = .79, 
RMSEA = .01; thus, we modeled the EI braches as separate first-order factors so as to not 
mask the variability in the branches and engender biased estimates.  
[Table 1 here] 
In terms of the model we estimated, along with the 11 conditions (one condition is 
omitted as the baseline condition) and the predictors (i.e., EI, IQ, and personality) we also 
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controlled for various respondent demographic characteristics1. Refer to Table 2 for full 
results. Surprisingly, none of the MSCEIT branches predicted performance, either individually 
or simultaneously; that is, the increment in prediction provided by the MSCEIT branches 
simultaneously, beyond the rest of the predictors and the controls, was not significant, χ2(4) = 
7.50, p > .10. Also, the direction of the prediction went the wrong way (i.e., linear combination 
of β = .26, thus increasing response time though not significantly). General intelligence (β = -
.23, p < .01) and Openness to Experience (β = -.22, p < .05) speeded up response time and age 
slowed it down (β = .22, p < .01).  
The priming conditions had a strong simultaneous effect on response time; furthermore, 
response times were significantly faster when the word was congruent with the target as 
compared to the distractor or control conditions (see note in Table 2). With respect to the 
baseline condition, evaluating a word related to happiness that was previously associated with 
the target speeded up correct answers. This result shows that shared valence between the prime 
and the test trial facilitated the task when words were of positive valence. Furthermore, when 
the lexical decision task involved a nonword, responses were on average, slower. Considering 
that we used regular words with a misspelled letter as nonwords—such as “xappy” instead of 
“happy”—this result is not surprising and might be due to the fact that encoding the misspelled 
word took more processing time, leading to overall slower response.  
[Table 2 here] 
4. Discussion 
The purpose of our study was to investigate which individual differences among EI (as 
measured by the MSCEIT), general intelligence, and personality predicted performance in a 
laboratory task involving selective attention to emotional stimuli. We found that IQ and the 
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personality trait of openness predicted faster correct answers. Interestingly, we found that the 
MSCEIT correlated—at times quite strongly—with fluid intelligence and personality, but did 
not predict performance. Of note is that we accounted for the attenuating effects of 
measurement error, which the literature has oftentimes ignored (which may explain why we 
report higher correlations between the MSCEIT and Gf).  
The role of attentional processes in emotion regulation was recently brought up by 
Wadlinger and Isaacowitz (2010); selecting certain aspects of the situation as the focus of 
attention may be used as a regulatory strategy aimed at maintaining a desirable emotional state 
and at terminating or improving an undesired one.  Being able to regulate emotions is a 
fundamental feature of individuals who use emotions intelligently. Such individuals should 
have greater sensitivity (or attention) to emotional cues, but also greater ability to select, 
among several stimuli, the emotion information that may help to reach the desirable state. Both 
selective-attention processes serve this purpose: Paying-attention to appropriate emotion 
information or ignoring inappropriate emotion information helps focus on the task at hand. 
Theoretically, an EI test should predict performance in a task that requires one to selectively 
pay attention to certain emotion information. The MSCEIT, however, did not show any 
relationship with the selective attention task.  
These findings may be explained by the fact that we measured emotion processes 
occurring spontaneously and with little engagement of effortful thinking (and generally 
associated with nonconscious processing). Indeed, the stimuli of the selective attention task 
were presented at short stimulus onset asynchrony of 350 msec, which are generally associated 
with nonconscious processing. Interesting, Roberts and colleagues (Roberts et al., 2006) also 
did not find association between the emotion perception branch of the MSCEIT and the 
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Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect Recognition Test (JACBART; Matsumoto et al., 2000), a 
test that consists of recognizing emotions in faces presented as fast as 200 msec. Important to 
note is that performance on the MSCEIT test may be driven by conscious processing (i.e., to 
answer test items participants need be engaged in thoughtful thinking about their own and 
others’ emotional experience). Thus, the MSCEIT and the selective attention task may be 
tapping into different ways of processing emotion information (effortful vs. nonconscious). 
The main implication of the MSCEIT failing to predict performance in the selective attention 
task is that the MSCEIT may not predict emotionally intelligent behaviors that depend on 
spontaneous/nonconscious processing (Fiori, 2009). Still, though, it is reasonable to expect that 
a test of EI captures some sort of nonconscious performance hence our surprise in finding null 
results for the MSCEIT factors. 
It is also possible though that the MSCEIT might not predict actual performance 
requiring emotional processes; in fact, the MSCEIT seems to rely on emotion knowledge 
individuals have about emotion (an outcome that we did not measure in the current study), 
rather than how individuals use emotions knowledge in real situations. Indeed, the issue that 
the MSCEIT does not appear to capture situational aspects of performance has been brought up 
recently (cf. Cherniss, 2010; Jordan, Dasborough, Daus, & Ashkanasy, 2010). As a matter of 
fact the MSCEIT does not measure actual performance, but performance in hypothetical 
situations: For instance, some items of the MSCEIT require respondents to identify the best 
strategy to cope with emotionally involving situations described in a short vignette. Individuals 
may correctly answer such items simply relying on their emotion knowledge. Yet, emotion 
knowledge per se does not guarantee that individuals will be able to use that knowledge in real 
life situations (see also Fiori, 2009). Beyond emotion knowledge, the selective attention task 
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employed in the current research requires individuals to activate emotion information and 
inhibit distracting emotion information in order to succeed in the task. Clearly, the selective 
attention task involves mainly emotion processes in action, whereas the MSCEIT involves 
mainly emotion knowledge applied to hypothetical situations, (suggesting that the test might 
not be ecologically valid).  
Finally, another possibility that explains why the MSCEIT did not predict results is that 
this test may measure something different from what it is claimed to measure. The MSCEIT is 
supposed to measure the latent construct of EI, which concerns the capacity to process emotion 
information and use this information for better adjustment (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008). 
Our results dispute this proposition.  
As concerns the other predictors, interesting results emerged regarding the relationship 
between general intelligence and selective attention to emotion information. A number of 
studies confirmed the association among intelligence, working memory, and the ability to stay 
focused on goal relevant information in the face of distracting stimuli (Dempster, 1991; Kane 
& Engle, 2003; Schweizer, Moosbrugger, & Goldhammer, 2005; Unsworth, Spillers, & 
Brewer, 2010). In the current study we analyzed the relationship between general intelligence 
and attentional processes involving emotional, rather than nonemotional stimuli.  The result 
that general intelligence predicted faster correct responses is aligned with the finding that high 
IQ individuals are faster at retrieving and processing information, and this irrespective of the 
type of information. For instance Austin, Deary, and Willock (2001) found a correlation of -.49 
between intelligence and 4 choice reaction time in a population of Scottish participants aged 
56. We demonstrate a similar finding involving emotional, rather than nonemotional stimuli, 
thus further extending the generalizability of IQ. Furthermore, our results complement findings 
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from other types of tasks showing that intelligence (and working memory) are very important 
for performance involving pre-anticipatory emotional activation (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & 
Anderson, 1998; Hinson, Jameson, Whitney, 2002) and that EI measured as a trait fails to 
predict performance in this domain (Demaree, Burns, & DeDonno, 2010).  
As for personality, Openness to Experience showed very similar effects to general 
intelligence: It predicted faster correct answers. Interestingly, this personality trait (referred to 
as “Intellect”) usually correlates with IQ (e.g., Gignac, Stough, & Loukomitis, 2004; Goff & 
Ackerman, 1992); yet, in our study it also demonstrated incremental validity. It may be that 
open individuals, like more intelligent ones, tend to process information quickly. Also, the 
priming task we used involved a great deal of novelty with unusual and fast stimuli. 
Theoretically, individuals high in Openness might be more mentally flexible and better able to 
adjust their decision strategies in handling such information.  
Finally, and in terms of the limitations of our work, two aspects limit its 
generalizability. First although the sample size of students was sufficiently large (particularly 
on a within-subject level) to detect significant effects for several of the covariates and the 
conditions we manipulated, our study should be replicated with a larger sample to ensure that 
the EI results were not due to a Type II statistical error (i.e., that the study was underpowered); 
important to note here is that despite probable the range-restriction of intelligence scores (given 
that students are selected to university on the basis of ability) we found significant effects of 
intelligence on performance, which suggests that our study was not underpowered. That we 
found nonsignificant effects on EI—a factor on which students are not selected to university—
suggests that the null results are due to the test per se and not to lack of statistical power or 
range restriction (as mentioned earlier, the variability in the MSCEIT scores paralleled that of a 
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very large-scale study). Second, our results are based exclusively on a student sample and 
might not necessarily hold for a more diverse population of individuals; although results from 
student samples usually mirror those of larger populations (Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 
1999) future research should use a more diverse sample particularly with younger as well as 
with older individuals.  
5. Conclusions 
The extent to which emotion processing may depend on general intelligence, emotional 
intelligence, and personality traits is a topic of great theoretical relevance. The current research 
was meant to provide a contribution on this issue by analyzing performance in an emotional 
task that required using selective attention to succeed in the task.  
The most surprising result was that the MSCEIT did not predict performance in our 
experiment. This result, which adds to recent research challenging the validity of the MSCEIT 
(Fiori & Antonakis, 2011; Maul, in press), casts doubts on the extent to which the MSCEIT 
may measure EI and predict emotionally intelligent behavior. Researchers and practitioners are 
advised to take our findings seriously especially when using the MSCEIT for clinical or 
occupational decisions.  Replicating results with a larger and more representative sample, and 
with other emotion tasks would further enrich the understanding of what the MSCEIT really 
measures.   
We also found that IQ and the personality trait of openness predicted faster answers; 
these factors may facilitate information processing when dealing with emotional stimuli, 
especially in tasks that require ignoring distracting emotion information. Our results speak to 
the need for new measures of EI as an ability and for further understanding of the role of 
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intelligence and openness in emotionally intelligent performance based on criteria different 
from speed of response, which is known to be related to g.    
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Figure 1. Sequence of the priming task. 
 
 
 
 
Note: in the above example, the lexical decision task (LDT) was congruent with the distractor.  
FIXATION
CATEGORIZATION 
TASK
LEXICAL 
DECISION TASK
BLANK SCREEN
PRIME TRIAL
500 MSEC
150 MSEC
200 MSEC
Reaction time
recorded if  
< 3000 MSEC
UNTIL RESPONSE
HAPPY
1. HAPPY FACE
2. SAD FACE
3. ANGRY FACE
4. SURPRISED FACE
“Look at the 
face colored 
green”
“Is it a word?”
YES/NO answer
“Which category 
did the face 
belong to?”
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Table 1: Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of key variables  
 
 
 
 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
 
 
  
             
 
 
  
             
1 IQ (/10)1 2.25 .49              
2 EI: Branch 1 (Perceiving.) .60 .11 .33             
3 EI: Branch 2 (Facilitating) .46 .08 .34 .40            
4 EI: Branch 3 (Understanding) .56 .11 .39 .33 .52           
5 EI: Branch 4 (Managing) .38 .10 -.02 .12 .57 .42          
6 Extraversion 3.24 .75 .01 -.01 .00 -.22 .22         
7 Agreeableness 3.84 .64 .02 .14 .52 -.04 .31 .09        
8 Conscientiousness 3.69 .60 -.24 .21 .06 .02 .11 .03 .30       
9 Neuroticism 2.91 .71 -.29 -.31 -.15 -.09 .07 -.29 -.41 -.16      
10 Openness 3.65 .54 -.06 .11 .13 .40 .46 .10 -.14 .20 .14     
11 Male .45 .50 .09 -.12 -.32 -.14 -.27 .07 -.20 -.12 -.26 -.09    
12 English-speaking .88 .32 .18 .28 .21 .39 .25 .10 -.03 .05 -.05 .17 .01   
13 Age 19.10 1.62 -.16 -.25 -.41 -.21 -.08 -.03 -.33 .07 .12 .06 .24 -.09  
14 Response time (/1000)2 1.15 .45 -.15 -.06 .04 -.09 .00 .03 .11 .05 -.02 -.16 .02 -.08 .14 
 
 
  
             
 
Note: n = 6649 trials (for n = 85 participants). 1,2We divided these variables with a constant to move the decimal place to the left and 
assure convergence of the estimator (original SDs for IQ and Response time were 4.92 and 453.87 respectively). Given the nested 
nature of the data, we do not report p-values for the significance of the correlations; we corrected for non-independence of 
observations in the estimation procedure using a cluster-robust variance estimator. Correlations are latent level. 
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Table 2: Structural equation estimates predicting response time 
 
  
Unstandardized Estimates 
 
Standardized Estimates 
 Coef. SE z p β SE z p 
Individual Difference Predictors         
IQ -.23 .08 -2.82 .01 -.23 .08 -2.84 .00 
EI: Branch 1 (Perceiving) .12 .35 .33 .74 .03 .08 .33 .74 
EI: Branch 2 (Facilitating) 1.07 .97 1.11 .27 .18 .17 1.10 .27 
EI: Branch 3 (Understanding) .69 .84 .83 .41 .15 .19 .82 .41 
EI: Branch 4 (Managing) -.51 .60 -.84 .40 -.11 .13 -.84 .40 
Extraversion .10 .07 1.30 .19 .15 .11 1.31 .19 
Agreeableness .10 .16 .61 .54 .12 .20 .62 .54 
Conscientiousness -.02 .07 -.21 .83 -.02 .08 -.21 .83 
Neuroticism .06 .09 .76 .45 .09 .12 .75 .45 
Openness -.20 .09 -2.34 .02 -.22 .09 -2.30 .02 
Male .06 .06 1.10 .27 .07 .06 1.11 .27 
English-speaking -.13 .10 -1.23 .22 -.09 .08 -1.22 .22 
Age .06 .02 2.60 .01 .22 .09 2.44 .02 
Asian -.02 .10 -.23 .82 -.03 .11 -.23 .82 
Hispanic .09 .12 .73 .47 .07 .10 .73 .47 
White .04 .11 .33 .74 .04 .11 .33 .74 
Conditions1         
1. Angry/Distractor (1376) .00 .03 -.11 .91 .00 .01 -.11 .91 
2. Sad/Distractor (1380)  .00 .02 .05 .96 .00 .01 .05 .96 
3. Happy/Distractor (1389) .01 .02 .44 .66 .01 .01 .44 .66 
4. Angry/Target (1420) .04 .03 1.59 .11 .02 .01 1.57 .12 
5. Sad/Target (1420) .04 .02 1.87 .06 .02 .01 1.86 .06 
6. Happy/Target (1270) -.11 .02 -5.88 .00 -.07 .01 -5.89 .00 
7. Angry/Control (1481) .10 .03 3.58 .00 .04 .01 3.54 .00 
8. Sad/Control (1361) -.02 .03 -.71 .48 -.01 .01 -.71 .48 
9. Happy/Control (1411) .03 .02 1.67 .09 .02 .01 1.67 .10 
10. Nonword/Control (1462) .08 .02 4.15 .00 .08 .02 4.04 .00 
Intercept -.05        
R-square .14 .04 3.11 .00     
 
Note: 1The mean model-predicted response time is reported in parentheses. n = 6649 trials 
(for n = 85 participants). We reported standardized coefficients in the text. The baseline 
dummy variable for race was “African-American”; the baseline dummy variable for 
condition was “Control/Surprise” (mean predicted value was 1379 ms). SE’s (standard 
errors) are cluster robust. The conditions simultaneously predict response time as indicated 
by a Wald test, χ2(10) = 111.70, p < .001. The linear combination of Conditions 4, 5, and 6 
significantly reduced response time, β = -.03, p < .001, that of Conditions 1, 2, and 3 did 
not significantly reduce response time, β = .01, p > .10, and that of Conditions 7, 8, and 9 
significantly increased response time, β = .12, p < .10. The linear combination of 
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 as well as Conditions 7, 8, and 9, had significantly slower response 
times than did Conditions 4, 5, and 6 (p’s < .001).  
 37
______________________________ 
Footnote 
 
1The exact model we estimated, whose coefficients are reported in the same order in Table 
2, for individual i responding on trial j, was: 
 =  + 	 + 
 +  +  +  +  + 	 + 	
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%'
+ # ()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)'
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Where y refers to response time, β0 refers to an intercept, E through EI, refers to the latent 
variables extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, openness, general intelligence, 
and the four EI branches respectively. Male is a dummy variable indicating sex, English is 
a dummy variable indicating having English as a first language, and age refers to 
chronological age. R refers to four race categories captured in k-1 dummy variables. C 
refers to the 11 conditions, captured in m-1 dummy variables. Finally, e is a disturbance 
term.  
